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On some cost allocation problems in
communication networks∗
Darko Skorin-Kapov†
Abstract. New technologies prompted an explosion in the de-
velopment of communication networks. Modern network optimization
techniques usually lead to a design of the most profitable, or the least
cost network that will provide some service to customers. There are
various costs and gains associated with building and using a communi-
cation network. Moreover, the involved multiple network users and/or
owners possibly have conflicting objectives. However, they might coop-
erate in order to decrease their joint cost or increase their joint profit.
Clearly, these individuals or organizations will support a globally ’attrac-
tive’ solution(s) only if their expectations for a ’fair share’ of the cost or
profit are met. Consequently, providing network developers, users and
owners with efficiently computable ’fair’ cost allocation solution proce-
dures is of great importance for strategic management. This work is an
overview of some recent results (some already published as well as some
new) in the development of cooperative game theory based mechanisms
to efficiently compute ’attractive’ cost allocation solutions for several
important classes of communication networks.
Key words: communication networks, cost allocation, cooperative
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Sazˇetak.Nove tehnologije izazvale su dramaticˇan razvoj komunikaci-
jskih mrezˇa. Moderne optimizacijske tehnike obicˇno tezˇe dizajnu sˇto
ekonomicˇnijih mrezˇa, koje c´e zadovoljiti odred¯ene potrebe korisnika. Uz
gradnju i koriˇstenje komunikacijskih mrezˇa vezani su razni trosˇkovi i za-
rade, koji cˇesto ukljucˇuju korisnike i/ili vlasnike mrezˇa potencijalno kon-
fliktnih ciljeva i interesa. Unatocˇ razlikama, za ocˇekivati je da bi oni ht-
jeli surad¯ivati ako med¯usobna suradnja umanjuje zajednicˇke trosˇkove ili
pak povec´ava zajednicˇke profite. Jasno je da c´e pojedinci ili organizacije
podrzˇavati zajednicˇki atraktivna rjesˇenja samo ako su ispunjena njihova
individualna ocˇekivanja glede “pravedne” raspodjele trosˇkova ili profita.
Posljedica toga je da je stratesˇki vazˇno za dizajnere, vlasnike i korisnike
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komunikacijskih mrezˇa imati na raspolaganju efikasne, izracˇunljive pro-
cedure za “pravednu” raspodjelu trosˇkova. Ovaj rad je pregled novijih
rezultata (nekih vec´ publiciranih, kao i nekih sasvim novih) iz podrucˇja
kooperativne teorije igara koji se bavi razvojem mehanizama za efikasno
izracˇunavanje “atraktivnih” rjesˇenja problema raspodjele trosˇkova za neko-
liko vazˇnih klasa komunikacijskih mrezˇa.
Kljucˇne rijecˇi: komunikacijske mrezˇe, raspodjela trosˇkova, kooper-
ativne igre, matematicˇko programiranje
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1. Introduction
Recent technology advances prompted an explosion in the development of commu-
nication networks. It is a general opinion that efficient networking is necessary to
preserve a competitive edge in today’s society. There are various costs associated
with building a communication network, which involves multiple network users and
owners. The various network users and owners may wish to cooperate in order to
decrease their joint cost or profit. Clearly, they will support a globally ’attractive’
solution(s) if they are charged a ’fair’ share of the total cost. The main objectives
of network cost allocation studies is to define so called ’fair’ cost allocation solution
concepts and to develop mechanisms to efficiently compute ’fair’ cost allocation so-
lutions. In this paper we are concerned with the cooperative game theory approach
to the area of cost allocation in communication networks. The paper presents an
overview of some cooperative game theory-based formulations of the network cost
allocation problems and some recently developed mechanisms to efficiently solve
those problems for several important classes of networks.
There is a body of literature that studies the computation of cost allocation
solution concepts for some related network cooperative games. The combinatorial
issues are particularly complex, and the literature mostly deals with deriving prop-
erties of various cost allocation solutions restricted to special classes of networks
and in the context of a particular problem. Nevertheless, many techniques used
therein are not necessarily conceptually limited to such special networks and are
expected to be helpful in further developments for more general and practical cases.
The first, and most studied is the class of Minimum Cost Spanning Trees
(MCST) (see for example Bird [1976]) in which the set of users should be linked
to a single special node (hub) at minimum cost. The weight of each link (edge)
indicates the cost of that link and we must then allocate the cost of edges to the
users, who are represented as nodes. The cost allocation problem associated with
MCST problem is formulated as a cooperative game referred to as the MCST game.
The main objective of cooperative game approach to this problem is to find stable
cost allocations which will encourage everyone to stay with the grand coalition, and
will give no monetary incentive to any subset of users to secede and build their own
competing subnetwork. It turns out that stable cost allocations exist for the MCST
problem. Moreover, we will be interested in further refining of such stable cost
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allocations in order to support network growth and dynamic cost changes (Kent
and Skorin-Kapov [1996, 1997]). Namely, it is of great importance to set up a cost
allocation scheme in such a way that will encourage new users to join the network,
and will not give any of already present users a reason to block others from joining.
In addition, we would like that the cost allocation scheme gives no incentive to
anyone to inflate the cost of any link.
An important class of games that generalizes MCST games is the class of Steiner
tree games (Skorin-Kapov [1995]). The Steiner tree game is once again concerned
with the allocation of the cost of a certain service that is provided to users inhab-
ited at network nodes. The main difference from the MCST game is that in the
Steiner tree games some nodes may be switching points (there are no users residing
at them). This assumption has profound practical implications in the modeling of
communication networks. Unfortunately, it also increases the computational dif-
ficulty. By contrast to MCST games, the stable cost allocations for Steiner tree
network game do not necessarily exist. (Tamir [1991]). We will comment on a
heuristic algorithm (Skorin-Kapov [1995]) for finding core points when they exist.
Another class of even more practical design communication network problems is
the class of Capacitated Network Design (CND) problems. Here the set of users is in
need of a certain service that can be provided by connecting them (possibly through
other users and/or switching points) to capacitated facilities, yet to be constructed.
The objective is to build a network that will provide the above service at minimum
cost. The associated cost allocation problem is formulated as a cooperative CND-
game (Skorin-Kapov and Beltran [1994]). The CND game properly generalizes
MCST games, Steiner tree games and several other classes of games studied in the
literature. We outline the polynomial characterizations (Skorin-Kapov and Beltran
[1994]) of the ²-core and the nucleolus of the CND game.
The plan of the paper follows. In Section 2 we present some game theoretic
definitions and preliminaries needed for understanding of the rest of the paper.
In Section 3 we formally define the MCST game and give an overview of some
well known, as well as some new results. In Section 4 we outline some findings
from studies on Steiner tree games. In Section 5 known results on CND-games are
summarized. We finish with some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Definitions and preliminaries
In order to analyze the cost allocation problem associated with the optimization
problems in communication networks, we need to introduce the following game
theoretic definitions and notation. Let P= {1,2,· · ·,n} be a finite set of players and
let c: 2P → R, with c(∅) = 0, be a characteristic function defined over subsets of P
referred to as coalitions. The characteristic function c is submodular if c(S)+c(T) ≥
c(S∪T)+c(S∩T) for all S,T⊆P. If c is submodular, (N;c) is said to be concave. If
c(P ) designates a cost that has to be shared by all the players, then the pair (P ;c)
is called a (cost) cooperative game, or simply a game. For x∈R|P| and S⊆ P , let
x(S) ≡ ∑j∈S xj. We can interpret x(S) as the part of the total cost paid by the
coalition S. A cost allocation vector x in a game (P ;c) satisfies x(P ) = c(P ), and the
solution theory of cooperative games is concerned with the selection of a reasonable
subset of cost allocation vectors.
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In cooperative game theory, several different solution concepts for fair cost allo-
cation have been suggested (for a survey of these concepts see, for example, Young
[1985] or Driessen [1988]). Central to the solution theory is the concept of solution
referred to as the core of a game. The core of a game (P;c) consists of all vectors
x∈R|P | such that x(S) ≤ c(S) for all S⊆P, and x(P) = c(P). Observe that the core
consists of all allocation vectors x which provide no incentive for any coalition to
secede. In general, the core of a game may be empty. For a real number ε, the
ε-core of a game (P;c) consists of all vectors x∈Rn such that x(S) ≤ c(S) + ε for
all ∅ 6=S⊂ P, and x(P) = c(P). Clearly for ε big enough the ε-core of the game
(P;c) is not empty. The least ε-core is the intersection of all nonempty ε-cores.
Equivalently, let ε0 be the smallest ε such that the ε-core is not empty. Then the
least ε-core is the ε0-core.
The nucleolus, introduced by Schmeidler [1969], is another well known solution
concept. Intuitively, the nucleolus is an allocation that makes least-well-off coalition
S as well-off as possible in a lexicographic sense. We say that a coalition S is better-
off than T, relative to an allocation x, if c(S)−x(S) > c(T)−x(T). Formally, the
nucleolus can be presented as follows. For a game (P ;c) and an associated cost
allocation vector x, let quantity e(x,S) = c(S)−x(S) be referred to as the excess
of S relative to x, and let e(x) be a vector in R(2
|P |−2) whose entries are e(x,S),
∅ 6= S ⊂ P, arranged in a non decreasing order. The nucleolus is the vector x that
maximizes e(x) lexicographically. In contrast to the core, a nucleolus always exists.
Moreover, it is unique and it is contained in the core if the core is not empty.
Another reasonable approach is to define the excess of a coalition on a per capita
basis: e˜(x,S) = (1/|S|)(c(S)−x(S). Let e˜(x) be a vector in R(2n−2), whose entries
are e˜(x,S), ∅ 6= S ⊂ P, arranged in a nondecreasing order. The per capita nucleolus
(Grotte [1970]) is the vector x that maximizes e˜(x) lexicographically.
The population monotonic cost allocation scheme is a vector x= (xiS)i∈S,S⊆P,of
the game (P, c) if and only if:(i) for all S⊆P, xS(S) = c(S), and (ii) for all S⊆T⊆P
and i∈S,xiS ≤ xiT (no player’s cost increases if additional user joins the network). A
scheme that produces stable (core) cost allocation is said to be distance monotonic
as long as no player’s cost increases when any single edge weight is decreased (and
symmetrically no player’s cost decreases when any single weight is increased).
3. Minimum cost spanning tree (MCST) game
Consider a connected undirected network G= (N∪{O},E) with a set of nodes
N∪{O} and a set of arcs E. A common supplier O provides service which is required
by users, and any node receiving the service can in turn deliver it to adjacent nodes.
Each user in N is required to be connected, perhaps through other nodes, to a com-
mon supplier. There is a cost, w((i,j)) =wij ≥ 0 , (i,j) ∈ E, if arc (i,j) is used to
deliver service. The objective is to provide service to the communities in N at a
minimum cost. We will refer to the above optimization problem as the Minimum
Cost Spanning Tree (MCST) problem.
The cost allocation is concerned with the fair distribution of the cost of provid-
ing the service among customers. In order to analyze the cost allocation problem
associated with the MCST problem, we formulate this cost allocation problem as
a cooperative game. Consider the MCST problem on a network G= (N∪{O}, E),
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with a set of users N. Denote by MCSTQ , for Q⊆N, the MCST problem obtained
from the original problem by simply requesting that only nodes in Q have to be
connected. Then, the pair (N;c), where c : 2|N| →R is such that c(∅) = 0 and for
each Q⊆N c(Q) is the minimum objective function value of MCSTQ, is a game
to be referred to as the MCST-game. For x∈R|N| and Q⊆N, let x(Q) ≡∑j∈Qxj .
We can interpret x(Q) as the part of the total cost paid by the coalition Q. A cost
allocation vector x in a game (N;c) satisfies x(N) = c(N), and the solution theory
of cooperative games is concerned with the selection of a reasonable subset of cost
allocation vectors. Two versions were studied. The non-monotone version of the
MCST game allows a coalition S⊆N to use only nodes in S in order to construct
a minimal cost network, while a monotone MCST game allows a coalition S to use

















N = {a, b, c, d, e, f}
G = {N ∪ {O}, E}
Cost allocation x = (xa, xb, xc, xd, xe, xf ) = (1, 2, 1, 5, 2, 3) is in the core of the game
(N, c).
Figure 1. The core allocation of the MCST game
Recall that the cost allocation vector x belongs to the core if for each Q,Q ⊂
N, x(Q) ≤ c(Q). Observe that the core consists of all allocation vectors x which
provide no incentive for any coalition to secede. The exponential number of core
constraints, coupled with the fact that MCSTQ problem (in monotone version) is
NP -complete whenever 2< |Q| < |N | (this is the Steiner tree problem, known to be
NP -complete, see Garey and Johnson, [1979]), makes the core computation very
difficult. Clearly, in case of monotone MCST-game determining whether a given
cost allocation is in the core is NP-complete. However, Bird [1976] and D. Granot
and Huberman [1981] showed that the MCST game has a non-empty core and
found some points in the core. For example, consider the tree shown in Figure 1,
and assume that it is a MCST in the complete graph G= {N ∪ {O}, E}. It can
be shown that the cost allocation in which each user j pays the cost of a unique
edge (i, j) of the MCST is in the core of the associated MCST-game .
It is useful to consider the directed formulation of the MCST problem. The
Minimum Cost Directed Spanning Tree (MCDST) problem is defined with respect
to a directed weighted graph G= (N∪{O},E) with a weight (cost) function w :E
→ R+. Namely, find a directed spanning tree T= (NT ∪ {O},ET) in G, rooted
away from node O, such that the total edge-weight of T is minimum. It is clear
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that any MCST problem can be solved by considering an appropriate MCDST
problem, obtained by replacing each edge of the given network by two arcs of
opposite directions.
The MCDST-game is then based on a well known integer programming formu-
lation of the minimum cost spanning tree problem. To describe the formulation,
we need the following notation. Let G= (N∪{O}) be a directed graph and N the
set of users. For a directed edge l= (i , j) we refer to i as the tail and j as a head
of l , and for a subset of vertices S, S⊆N, we denote by δ(S) the set of all directed
edges having their heads, but not their tails, in S. A subset S, S⊆N, is said to be a
cut-set of G, if S∩N6= ∅ and the subgraph G(S) of G induced by S is connected. We
denote by SN the set of all cut-sets of G. The MCDST problem can be formulated
as the following integer programming problem:
IP (N) : min
{
wt: t(δ(S)) ≥ 1, S ∈ SN, t ∈ {0, 1}
}
where t(i, j) ≡ 1 if (i, j) ∈ E is used in the MCDST, and zero otherwise.
For a subset Q⊆N let IP(N) be an integer programming problem obtained from
the original problem IP(Q) by simply replacing N by Q. Then, our MCST-game
based on the above formulation of the MCDST problem is the pair (N;c), where
c : 2|N| →R is such that c(∅) = 0 and for each Q⊆N, c(Q) is the minimum objective
function value of IP(Q).
The nonemptiness of the core of the MCST game is also alternatively shown
in Granot [1986] based on results of Edmonds [1967]. Therein, the MCST game
is formulated as the generalized linear production game (Granot [1986]), which is
in turn a generalization of Owens’s [1975] linear production game. So far it was
not possible to characterize the entire core. On the other hand, some subsets of
the core were characterized by several authors. It was shown (Granot [1986]) that
in a linear production game feasible duals belong to the core, Aaarts and Driessen
[1991] and Feltkamp et. al. [1994} further analyzed the structure of the core and
the subset of the core called irreducible core of a MCST game.
The work of Kent and Skorin-Kapov [1996] leads to algorithmic finding of some
core points based on the dual of the linear programming relaxation LP(N) of IP(N).







yS ≤ we, for all e ∈ E;S ∈ SN , yS ≥ 0 for all S
}
.
Let yS , S∈ SN be a feasible solution to DP(N), and for each S∈ SN allocate the
amount yS arbitrarily to users in S. Let x∈RN be the vector of costs allocated by this
operation. It was shown by Skorin-Kapov [1995] that this partial cost allocation
satisfies the core constraints. Since the objective function of LP(N) is a lower
bound to IP(N), so is the value of the dual objective for any feasible dual solution.
Thus, the vector x∈RN constructed above, gives us an allocation of some fraction
of the total cost c(N).
Kent and Skorin-Kapov [1996] constructed an algorithm that finds an optimal
solution to DP(N).Moreover, they proved that the optimal value of DP(N) coincides
with the optimal value of IP(N). This further implies that their algorithm delivers
core points. For completeness, we will outline below the slight modification of their
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algorithm. The algorithm starts with all dual variables at zero value. The k-th
iteration of the algorithm increases yS for each subset of users S of size k as much
as possible without violating dual feasibility.
The Core Algorithm:
Input: A weighted complete network G= (N ∪O,E). The minimum
cost directed panning tree T= (NT ∪ {O}, ET).
Initialization: Set xp = 0, for all p ∈N, wij = wji = Wij for all node pairs
(i, j), and yS = 0 for all S ∈ SN. ( xp, p ∈N is the cost
allocated to a user p, and yS, S ∈ SN are the values of dual
variables).
Main Algorithm
“Begin by finding a potential allocating set S”.
Do for k= 1,. . .,|N|,
Do for each node p ∈ N
Let S= {p}.
Do until |S| = k or no additional nodes can be added to S.
If there exist (i, j) ∈ δ(S) such that w(i, j) =, i 6= O; let S = S ∪ {i}.
EndDo
“Next we allocate as much as possible to S.”
If for all e ∈ δ(S), w(e) > 0
Let yS = min {w(e), e ∈ δ(S)}.
Choose arbitrary ap , p∈S such that
∑
p∈Sap = yS .
Do for all p∈S
Let xp = xp+ap
EndDo
Do for all e ∈ δ(S)






Theorem 1. Given an instance of the MCST game on a graph G, the Core Algo-
rithm allocates the entire cost of the MCST, and the resulting allocation is in the
core of the MCST game on G.
The cost allocations generated by the Core Algorithm are related to the irre-
ducible core. For a given minimal cost spanning tree T, the irreducible core is the
set of all allocations which are core allocations for every MCST game which has T
as a minimal tree. It can be shown (Kent [1997]) that the set of core allocations
generated by the core algorithm coincides with the irreducible core.
The above core algorithm was also presented in studies on population and dis-
tance monotonic cost allocation schemes for the MCST problem by Kent and Skorin-
Kapov [1996,1997]). Therein they proposed a modification of the above Core Algo-
rithm, thus providing a cost allocation scheme which is supporting dynamic changes
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in the network. In the proposed modification instead of allocating the dual value
yS arbitrarily to users in S we allocate yS/|S| to all users in S. We refer to a modi-
fied algorithm as to a Population Monotonic Scheme (PMS). It turns out that the
PMS is generating stable cost allocations (core points) which are simultaneously
population and distance monotonic. Namely, when a new player (user) joins the
network and the new core allocation is found by the PMS, the cost will not increase
to any of old players. Consequently, nobody will have the incentive to block the
new user from joining the network. Moreover, if the cost of some link goes down
(respectively up) no player’s cost will go up (respectively down). Thus nobody will
have incentive to inflate the cost of some link.
Theorem 2. The PMS yields a population monotonic cost allocation scheme.
Theorem 3. The PMS yields a distance monotonic cost allocation scheme.
4. Steiner tree (ST) game
It is rare that theoretical terms find their usage in law statements. Therefore, it is
particularly interesting and exciting to find out that the research on cost allocation
in networks is directly relevant to policy decision making. Namely, Federal USA
Law has landed added importance to work on cost allocation on minimum span-
ning trees and Steiner trees. Federal tariffs (see F.P. Preparata and M.F. Shamos,
[1985]) require the following: “When the Long Lines Department of the Telephone
Company establishes a communication hookup for a customer, federal tariffs re-
quire that the billing rate be proportional to the length of a minimum spanning tree
connecting the customers’ termini ...” The same source gives the following com-
ment: “This law is a Solomon-like compromise between what is desirable and what
is practical to compute, for the minimum spanning tree is not the shortest possible
interconnecting network if new vertices may be added to the original set. With this
restriction lifted, the shortest tree is called a Steiner tree”. Therefore, from the Fed-
eral Communications Commission’s (FCC) point of view, the Steiner tree approach
was recognized as desirable, but due to its complexity, not practical to compute.
In this Section we will outline the results from recent work on the cost allocation
for the minimum cost Steiner Tree networks by Skorin-Kapov [1995]. Therein it
was shown for the first time (theoretically and computationally) that the fair cost
allocation solutions, or their good approximations, could be often efficiently found
on Steiner trees.
As already mentioned it is desirable that communication networks often have
nodes that serve as switches. Those switches might be used by network users who
do not necessarily reside at switch nodes. The associated optimization model is
referred to as the Minimum Cost Steiner Tree problem. Formally, it is defined with
respect to a weighted graph G= (N∪{O},E) with a weight (cost) function w:E→R+,
where N is the set of nodes and a (proper) subset of nodes D represents users. The
objective is to find a directed tree T= (NT ∪{O},ET) in G, rooted away from node
O and whose node set contains D, such that the total edge-weight of T is minimum.
Clearly the ST-game generalizes the class of minimum cost spanning tree games.
It is well known that in general the core of the ST-game may be empty. Consider
an example of the MCST game informally described in Figure 2 (this example was
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suggested by Tamir [1991]). Clearly the entire cost of the minimum cost Steiner
tree is c(N) = 5. On the other hand, for any core allocation each two member
coalition would not pay more than 3, i.e. xa+xb ≤ 3, xb+xc ≤ 3, xa+xc ≤ 3). The
latter implies that the entire cost allocated could not exceed 4.5. Hence, the core
is empty.
The ST-game is equivalent to the Fixed Cost Spanning Forest (FCSF) game,
and was studied by D. Granot and F. Granot [1992a] for a special case when the
underlying network G is a tree and by Skorin-Kapov [1992] when the underlying
network has a series-parallel structure. It is also somewhat related to Sharkey’s
[1990] study of the shared facility game. Therein, he defines a simple facility game,
and shows that the core of a simple facility game is nonempty if and only if the
optimal values of the associated IP (Integer Program) and LP (Linear Program)
are equal. In the ST-game the relationship between certain IP and LP associated
with the ST-game plays an important role. Note however, that an ST-game is not
a simple facility game. The work of Skorin-Kapov [1995] provided the first analysis









N = {a, b, c}, G = {N ∪ {O}, E}, w(e) = 1 for every e ∈ E.
For S ⊆ N, c(S) = the total weight of the min. ST spanning O ∪ S.
Figure 2. Empty core of the ST-game (N, c)
Therein the directed version of the optimization problem is considered. With
the notation similar to that of Section 3 we now denote by δ(S) the set of all directed
edges having their heads, but not their tails, in S. A subset S, S⊆N, is said to be a
Steiner cut-set of G, if S∩D 6= ∅ (where D is the set of users) and the subgraph G(S)
of G induced by S is connected. We denote by SD the set of all Steiner cut-sets of
G. The DST problem can be formulated (Prodon et. al. [1985]) as the following
integer programming problem:
IP (D) : min
{
wx:x(δ(S)) ≥ 1, S ∈ SD, x ∈ {0, 1}
}
.
It is clear that any minimum cost ST problem can be solved by considering an
appropriate minimum cost DST problem, obtained by replacing each edge of the
given network by two arcs of opposite directions.
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The associated cost allocation problem can be described with the following co-
operative game. For a subset Q⊆D, let IP(Q) be an integer programming problem
obtained from the original problem IP(D) by simply replacing D by Q. Then, our
ST-game based on the above formulation of the DST problem is the pair (D;c),
where c : 2|D| →R is such that c(∅) = 0 and for each Q⊆D, c(Q) is the minimum
objective function value of IP(Q).
Consider the linear programming relaxation LP(D) of IP(D), defined as follows:
LP (D) : min
{
wx : x(δ(S)) ≥ 1, S ∈ SD , x ≥ 0
}
.
It turns out that the sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of the ST-
game is that the incidence vector of a minimum cost DST in G, rooted away from
O and whose vertex set contains D, is an optimal solution to LP(D). This result
follows for example, from Granot’s [1986] generalized linear production model or
equivalently from Wong’s [1984] and Tamir’s [1991] multicomodity flow formulation
(for details see Skorin-Kapov [1995]. The work of Prodon et. al. [1985] implies that
the above sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core is also necessary if the
underlying network G is series-parallel (for details see also Skorin-Kapov [1992]).
Next we present a counterexample (from Skorin-Kapov [1995]) which demon-
strates that, in general, the above sufficient condition is not necessary for the
nonemptiness of the core. Indeed, consider the network G= (N∪{O}, E) in Fig. 3.
Assume that all edge weights in G are 1 and let D= {5,6,7} be the set of users. Let



































Figure 3. G = (N ∪ {O}, E)
An optimal solution to IP(D) is indicated by bold arcs and has total weight
c(D) = 6. It is easy to check that vector (x5,x6,x7) = (2,2,2) is in the core C(D,c).


































2 , and x
∗
(i,j) = 0 otherwise, is feasible to LP(D) associated with
G and has the objective function value of 5.5.
Skorin-Kapov [1995] derived some technical sufficient conditions under which
the incidence vector of a given ST and the optimal solution for LP(D) coincide.
Moreover, he constructed a Core Heuristic whose first phase is similar to the Core
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Algorithm of Section 3. Namely, the feasible solution to the dual of LP(D) is con-
structed, and then the cost of dual variables is arbitrarily distributed among users
in dual sets. The heuristic is trying to construct feasible dual variables that sat-
isfy complementary slackness conditions, and the construction of dual sets heavily
depends on the optimal, or best known Steiner tree. This heuristic can be used
to allocate a fraction of the total cost while satisfying the core constraints. If the
total cost was not allocated by the first phase, then phase II of the core heuristic
contains some other complex technical conditions under which sometimes one can
allocate even more than the optimal dual value, and still preserve core conditions.
It was shown theoretically and experimentally that the portion of the allocated
cost that satisfies core constraints can be improved beyond the best value of dual
objective. Computational analyses performed on 76 well known (Wong’s [1984],
Beasley’s [1989] and Aneja’s [1980]) Steiner tree problems confirmed that the Core
Heuristic gives very tight bounds on the amount that can be allocated while satisfy-
ing the core constraints. Indeed, in 68 out of the above 76 cases the core heuristic
produced core points, and in the remaining cases it provided “good” lower bounds.
5. Capacitated network design game
Although the results presented in Sections 3 and 4 are encouraging, they are not
sufficient to solve even more complex network problems regularly appearing in prac-
tice. Namely, networks often have facilities that have limited capacities. This is
particularly true for switching points (line capacities often have unlimited capacities
for practical needs, for example, fiber optic cables).
Consequently, there is a need to study capacitated network design problems.
We now consider the following important class of (telecommunications) capacitated
network design problems. The set of users is in need of a certain service that
can be provided by connecting them (possibly through other users) to capacitated
facilities, yet to be constructed. The objective is to build a network that will provide
the above service at minimum cost. Formally, let G= (N,E ) be an underlying
complete undirected network with a set of nodes N and a set of links E. The set
N represents potential users, as well as potential facility sites. For each i∈N, let
di ≥ 0 be the demand for service at node i. A facility with capacity ui can be
constructed (“opened“) at node i∈N, at cost ci ≥ 0. Note that for some i∈N, we
can have for example di = 0 or ci = ∞ meaning, respectively, that user i does
not require any service, and that a facility can not be opened at site i. Open
facilities provide service required by the users, and any node receiving the service
can pass an unused portion of it to adjacent nodes. Each node i should receive the
service from a single facility and the facility opened at node i should serve at least
i itself. There is a cost, c((i,j)) = cij ≥ 0, (i,j) ∈E, if arc (i,j) is used to deliver
service. In the spirit of new technologies (satellites, optical fiber) we assume that
links have virtually no capacity limits. Each customer with a positive demand for
service should be connected, perhaps through other nodes, to an open facility. The
objective is to satisfy the demand for service, by opening facilities and connecting
the users to facilities, while satisfying the capacity constraints at minimum cost.
We will refer to the above optimization problem as the Capacitated Network Design
(CND) problem.
30 D. Skorin-Kapov
The CND problem generalizes many important problems that appear in the
design of communication networks. Among them are: Capacitated Minimum Span-
ning Tree (CMST) problem, Capacitated Concentrator Location (CCL) problem,
Capacitated Fixed Cost Spanning Forest (CFCSF) problem and Capacitated Steiner
Tree (CST) problem. With all these problems, naturally arises the problem of allo-
cating the corresponding total minimum cost among customers in a ’fair’ manner.
As in previous sections, we would like to allocate the cost in such a way that no
subset of users would have incentive to secede and build their own network.
The cost allocation problem associated with the CND problem (first formulated
in Skorin-Kapov and Beltran [1994]) is concerned with the allocation of the cost
incurred by satisfying the users’ demand for service. Consider a CND problem on
the network G= (N,E ). Denote by CNDS , for S⊆N, the CND problem obtained
from the original problem by simply setting demands di, for all i∈ N\S, to zero. The
pair (N; c), where c : 2N →R is such that c(∅) = 0 and for each S⊆N, c(S) is the
minimum objective function value of CNDS , is a cooperative game in characteristic
function form, to be referred to as the Capacitated Network Design (CND) game.
In the definition of the characteristic function c we assume that the coalition S,
while acting on its own, can establish a facility at a node i even if it is not owned
by S (i/∈S), and can use a link (i,j) even if it is not owned by S (i or j /∈S). Similar
approach in defining characteristic function was taken in some related uncapacitated
network games (for example, FCSF game (Granot and Granot [1992a]) and ST game
(Skorin-Kapov [1992,1995])). However, it might be reasonable to argue that nodes
out of S will not necessarily allow (at least not free of charge) a coalition S to
use nodes and links which are not controlled by S. Consequently, more restrictive
model in which coalition S can not use nodes out of S may also be of interest. If such
more restrictive approach is taken the CND game would be no longer monotone.
Nevertheless, the entire analysis that follows would still hold.
The first work in this direction was presented in Skorin-Kapov [1993]. Therein
he considered the cost allocation problem associated with the Capacitated Con-
centrator Covering (CCC) Problem. That problem is a special case of the CND
problem in which the cost of links were ignored, and only the cost of capacitated
switching facilities was allocated among users. Clearly, the cost allocation associ-
ated with the CCC problem is a very complex combinatorial problem, since the
CCC optimization problem is NP-hard. In addition, it can easily be shown that
the core of the CCC game (and the CND game) may be empty. Consider for ex-
ample, the network G= (N,E) consisting of a three node ring with N= {1,2,3} and
E= {(1,2),(2,3),(1,3)}. Assume that ci =C, di = 1, and Ui = 2 for every i∈N. Now,
one can easily verify that the core constraints induced by the two-member coalitions
are: (i) x1+x2 ≤ C, x1+x3 ≤ C, x2+x3 ≤ C , which implies that x1+x2+x3 ≤ 1.5C.
On the other hand, the entire cost is x1+x2+x3 = 2C. Thus, we conclude that the
core of the CCC game associated with G is empty.
Nevertheless, Skorin-Kapov [1993] provided an interesting game theoretic anal-
ysis of the CCC game which enabled the computation of certain game theoretic
solution concepts in polynomial time. That analysis was later extended (Skorin-
Kapov and Beltran [1994]) to the general case of the CND game which considers
both, the cost of links and the cost of capacitated facilities.
The main feature of these papers is that the introduction of capacities imposes
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a limit on the number of users that can be served by a single facility. Throughout
the analysis this feature was used to show that several game theoretic solution
concepts can be characterized with the same set of constraints (polynomial in size).
This further suggested that the computation of the above cost allocation solutions
may be feasible for a large class of quite realistic and practical capacitated network
design problems. In particular, an efficient representation of the core, which often
enables us to test whether the core of a CND game is empty, and generate core
points (if they exist) in polynomial time was derived.
Theorem 4. Let S = {S |S is a subset of N, such that an optimal solution to
CNDS has a single opened facility}. Then, the core of a CND game is given by all
cost allocations x ∈R|N|, satisfying: c(S)−x(S) ≥ 0, for all S∈ S, and c(N)−x(N) =
0 .
It is reasonable to assume that capacities ui , i∈N and demands di , i∈N are
such that the maximum number of users that can be served by a single facility is
bounded with some fixed upper bound K. Then the size of each set S∈ S is bounded
by K. Moreover, the size of a family of sets S is in the worst case bounded by a
K-degree polynomial and consequently sets in S can be generated in polynomial
time. This further implies that if c(N) is obtained as an optimal solution to the
CND problem, then the nonemptiness of the core of the CND game can be, at least
in theory, efficiently tested.
If the core of a CND game is not empty it may consist of many cost allocations
which are not equally “attractive“. Consider a simple example of a CND game
in which the underlying network G= (N,E ) consists of a three node chain, with
N= {1,2,3} and E= {(1,2),(2,3)}. Assume that demands are d1 =d2 =d3 = 1,
potential facility costs are c1 =c2 =c3 = 2, link costs are c12 = 0, c23 = 2, and
capacities of potential facilities are u1 =u2 =u3 = 2. It is easy to check that the
cost allocations x1 = 2, x2 = 0, x3 = 2 and x′1 = 1, x
′
2 = 1, x
′
3 = 2 are both in the
core of the game (N;c) associated with G. Clearly, the second solution is preferable
to player 1, while the first solution is preferable to player 2.
For the case when the core of a CND problem is not empty we will try to
determine an “attractive” point in the core, namely the nucleolus. A method for
computing the nucleolus by solving a sequence of linear programming (LP) problems
was implicitly suggested by Schmeidler [1969] and then further studied by numerous
authors. The kth LP problem, LPk, solved by this method is:
max
{
ε : εj = c(S)− x(S), S ∈ Pj, j = 1, . . . , k − 1, ε ≤ c(S)− x(S),
(LPk)
S 6∈ ∪k−1j=1Pj, xi ≤ c({i}), i = 1, . . . , n, x(N) = c(N)
}
,
where for j≥ 1, εj and Pj are, respectively, the optimal value and the set of subsets
whose corresponding inequality constraints are satisfied as equalities at an optimal
solution of LPj . The nucleolus is obtained at problem LPi if the optimal solution
to LPi is unique. We will refer to this method as the Linear Programming (LP)
procedure for computing the nucleolus.
It was shown by Skorin-Kapov and Beltran [1994] that only a small portion
(polynomial in size) of core constraints might be needed in the computation of the
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nucleolus. Namely, for the family of coalitions S used in Theorem4 the following
holds:
Theorem 5. If the core of a CND game is not empty then the nucleolus of a CND
game is completely determined by constraints associated with the family of coalitions
S.
Recall that the nucleolus is unique and it always exists. However, it appears to
be difficult to efficiently characterize the nucleolus of a CND game when the core
is empty. In the same paper Skorin-Kapov and Beltran [1994] proposed the least
weighted ε-core of the CND game as a solution concept for a fair cost allocation
associated with the CND problem.
For each coalition S, S⊆N, let wS , be the weight associated with S. Then the
weighted ε−core is a set of cost allocation vectors such that for all coalitions S,
∅ 6= S ⊂ N: c(S)−x(S) ≥ wS ε and c(N)−x(N) = 0.
The weighted ε-core can be interpreted as the set of efficient cost allocations
that can not be improved upon by any coalition S if forming a coalition entails a
cost −wS ε . Clearly, the weighted ε-core is not empty if ε is sufficiently small. Let
ε′ be the largest ε for which the weighted ε-core is not empty. Then the weighted
ε′-core is the least weighted ε-core. It appears that ε′ is particularly interesting
when it is negative, i.e. when the core of a game (N;c) is empty. For S⊆N, we can
think of−wS ε′ as the minimal weighted cost −wS ε, or cross-subsidy, for which the
weighted ε-core is not empty. Note that the above cost based subsidization does
not use the information about the willingness of a coalition S to pay. Also note that
even for the case of subsidy-free cost allocations, there is no generally preferable
method of choosing one subsidy-free allocation rather than another (see for example
Sharkey [1995]).
It was shown, that with a suitable choice of weights the least weighted ε-core
of a CND game can be characterized by the collection of constraints associated
with the family of coalitions S. It seems reasonable to assume that the potential
cross-subsidy absorbed by the coalition S should be proportional to the size of S or
the amount of total demand of users in S. Under such assumption additivity of the
weight function is a natural choice.
Let w be a real valued weight function, defined on the partition set of N, and
for S⊆N, let w(S) =wS . We say that the weight function w is additive, if for any
two subsets S1, S2 ⊆N, such that S1∩S2 = ∅, we have : wS1+wS2 =wS1∪S2 .
The weights wi , i∈N, should be decided upon on a case by case basis. One
reasonable practical suggestion for the choice of a weight function is an additive
function w, dependent on nodes demands, defined as follows: for i∈N, wi =di /D,
where D=
∑
i∈Ndi is the total demand for service of the entire network.
Theorem 6. Let wS , S⊆N, be the weights generated by an additive weight function
w. Then the least weighted ε-core of the CND game (N,c) is completely determined
by constraints associated with the collection of coalitions S.
For a special case, when the above weights in Theorem6 are wS =| S |, for all
S ⊂ N , the least weighted ε-core is called the least per capita ε-core.
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In order to further analyze the least weighted ε-core we introduce, for an arbi-
trary ε, the game (N ; cε) whose characteristic function cε is defined as follows:
cε(S) =
{
c(S)− wS ε, if ∅ 6= S ⊂ N
c(S), if S = N
Observe that the core of the game (N;cε) coincides with the weighted ε-core of
the game (N;c). Let ε′ be the largest ε for which the game (N;cε) has a nonempty
core. Then the core of a game (N;cε′) coincides with the least weighted ε-core of a
game (N;c). A sensible way of selecting a unique point from the least weighted ε-core
is selecting the nucleolus of the game (N;cε′). For example, when the core is empty,
under the assumption that every coalition has agreed to participate in a cross-
subsidy with additional cost −wS ε′, such a cost allocation would lexicographically
maximize minimal excess.
It appears that the nucleolus of a game (N;cε′) can also be characterized by the
set of constraints associated with the collection S.
Theorem 7. Let wS , S ⊆ N, be weights generated by an additive weight function
w. Assume that the core of a game (N;c) is empty, and let ε′ be the largest ε for
which the weighted ε-core of a game (N;c) is not empty. Then the nucleolus of a
corresponding game (N;cε′) is completely determined by constraints induced by the
collection of coalitions S.
Observe that if wS =|S|, for all S⊆N, and if the nucleolus of (N;cε′) is the unique
solution to the first linear program in the LP procedure for computing the nucleolus,
then the nucleolus of the game (N;cε′) coincides with the nucleolus per capita of
the game (N;c).
6. Some concluding remarks
Due to globalization and overall networking trends and today’s technology devel-
opments the research in the area of cost allocation in communication network is
becoming more important. However, this kind of research is hampered with the
combinatorial difficulty of associated computational problems. Moreover, there are
no definite answers to what could be considered a “fair” cost allocation (for more
detailed discussion see Sharkey [1995]).
Please note that the overview of cost allocation problems and solutions pre-
sented in this paper is not exhaustive. It is mostly concentrated on classes of
networks that posses tree structure. Moreover, it is mostly concerned with authors
recent contributions to the field. In order to better inform the reader about the
state of knowledge in the area of cost allocation in networks, we will mention in the
sequel several other contributions and their relation to the work presented in this
paper.
An important class of games that generalizes MCST games is the class of span-
ning network games (see. Granot and Maschler [1991], D. Granot and F. Granot
[1992a], Feltkamp et. al. [1994], Skorin-Kapov [1995]). Nouweland et al. [1993]
showed that the subclass of spanning network games coincides with monotonic
games. The spanning network game is once again concerned with the allocation of
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the cost of a certain service that is provided to users inhabited at network nodes.
The main difference from the MCST game is that in the spanning network games,
some nodes may be switching points and in addition to the cost of links the cost of
nodes might be considered.
A fruitful approach in the analysis of the cores of the above network games,
just like in Section 3 and 4 of this paper, is to seek a polynomial representation of
such games in the form of linear production games. The core of a linear production
game is a superset of the associated dual set. For example, this approach was also
used to analyze the core of the Uncapacitated Plant Location game on trees (Kolen
[1983], Kolen and Tamir [1990]), Location games (Granot [1987], Tamir [1992]), the
Synthesis game (Tamir [1991]), and the MCST game (Granot [1986]). There are
some special cases in which the core of a linear production game coincides with the
associated dual set. Specifically, these cases are the assignment games (Shapley and
Shubik [1972]), simple network flow games (Kalai and Zemel [1982]) and location
games (Tamir [1992]). Note that if the core properly contains the dual set, then to
verify whether a given vector is in the core is NP-complete (Chvatal [1978]). On
the other hand, if the core coincides with the dual set then the core membership
can be verified in polynomial time.
In principal, it seems that a ’good’ polyhedral representation of the optimiza-
tion problem paves the way for a ’good’ cost allocation heuristic. It was shown in
Section 4 that a ’good’ feasible dual solution of the optimization problem can be
used to generate lower bounds for the part of the cost that can be allocated while
satisfying the core constraints. Skorin-Kapov [1995] used this theoretical insight
to construct an efficient heuristic for producing good feasible dual solutions for the
Steiner tree problem on general networks, and then used those solutions to generate
point(s) in the core or close to it. Samet and Zemel [1984] and Dubey and Shapley
[1984] describe related results on the core and dual set of linear programming games
on the more general convex programming game. Linear programming games (see,
Owen [1982]) are well studied in the literature. However, most of the network op-
timization problems discussed herein require integrality of decision variables. That
makes their linear programming relaxation only a starting tool. In a work on shared
facility game, Sharkey [1990] defines a related game (referred therein as a simple
game), and shows that the core of that game is nonempty if and only if the optimal
values of the respective objective functions of the associated integer program and
linear program coincide. Similar results are shown for the Fixed Cost Spanning
Forest (FCSF) game on a tree (D. Granot and F. Granot [1992a]), and for the
FCSF game on a series parallel graph (Skorin-Kapov [1992]).
Cost allocation solutions associated with capacitated network design problems
were analyzed by Skorin-Kapov [1993], and Skorin-Kapov and Beltran [1994a,b]
(and summarized in this paper Section 5). Therein they show that the characteri-
zation of the least ²-core and the computation of the nucleolus is feasible even for
quite complex class of capacitated network problems.
In the cost allocation problems associated with network flow problems, the du-
ality theory of LP is represented with the maximum flow minimum cut theorem of
Ford and Fulkerson [1962]. For the basic network flow model see Shapley [1961]
and for the analysis of the core of the associated cooperative flow games see Kalai
and Zemel [1982a, 1982b], Granot and Hojati [1990], D. Granot and F. Granot
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[1992b] and Tamir [1992]. Some other related cost allocation models were studied
in communications and transportation networks. Granot and Hojati [1990] consid-
ered a simultaneous and non-simultaneous network synthesis game, and Sharkey
[1992] defined a game closely related to a simultaneous network synthesis game.
Tamir [1989] and Potters, Curiel and Tijs [1987] analyzed the traveling salesman
cost allocation problem. Bittlingmayer [1990] and Woroch [1995] analyzed the trian-
gular network as a model of an airline’s hub and spoke network, Derks and Kuipers
[1992] investigated the cost allocation associated with the routing problems. The
allocation of value for jointly provided services in telecommunication network was
studied by Linhart et. al. [1995]. The cost allocation in hub networks was studied
by Skorin-Kapov [1998].
Most of the above studies are concerned with attempts to characterize the core.
However, the core of the associated game may be empty, or the core may contain
points considered ’unfair’ by some users. In several network cost allocation papers,
some other cost allocation solutions were analyzed. For example, the nucleolus
(Granot [1984], Granot and Maschler [1991], Derks and Kuipers [1992]), the Shap-
ley value (Myerson [1977], Owen [1986], Granot and Hojati [1990]) and the weighted
least ε-core and nucleolus per capita (Skorin-Kapov [1993]). The sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of the population monotonic refinement of the core allocation
for cooperative games with transferable utility was studied by Sprumont [1990].
Clearly, the existing exact polynomial algorithms and characterizations of cost
allocation solutions developed for the above network problems are not sufficient
to handle the complexity of realistic cases of the cost allocation problem in gen-
eral communication networks. Yet, they would be a basis for the development of
heuristic algorithms. In addition, to overcome certain computational difficulties it
is worth seeking approximations or useful modifications of cost allocation solutions
we wish to compute.
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